Stewart v. Elk Valley: The Case of the Cocaine-Using Coal Miner by Bhabha, Faisal
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University
Osgoode Digital Commons
All Papers Research Papers, Working Papers, ConferencePapers
2018
Stewart v. Elk Valley: The Case of the Cocaine-
Using Coal Miner
Faisal Bhabha
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, fbhabha@osgoode.yorku.ca
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/all_papers
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Research Papers, Working Papers, Conference Papers at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in All Papers by an authorized administrator of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Repository Citation
Bhabha, Faisal, "Stewart v. Elk Valley: The Case of the Cocaine-Using Coal Miner" (2018). All Papers. 323.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/all_papers/323
HOW TO NAVIGATE HUMAN 
RIGHTS ISSUES RELEVANT IN 
TODAY'S WORKPLACE 
CONSTITUTIONAL, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW/ 
LABOUR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 
February 6, 2018 
DISCLAIMER 
This work appears as part of the Ontario Bar Association's initiatives in 
continuing legal education. It aims to provide information and opinion which will 
assist lawyers in maintaining and enhancing their competence. It does not, 
however, represent or embody any official position of, or statement by, the OBA 
except where this may be specifically indicated; nor does it attempt to set forth 
definitive practice standards or to provide legal advice. Precedents and other 
material contained herein are intended to be used thoughtfully, as nothing in the 
work relieves readers of their responsibility to consider it in the light of their own 
professional skill and judgment. 
NOTE RE PRECEDENTS 
The model precedents are provided for your consideration and use when you 
draft your own documents. They are NOT meant to be used "as is". Their 
suitability will depend upon a number of factors, such as the current state of the 
law and practice in each area of law, your writing style, your needs and the 
needs and preferences of you and your clients. These documents may need to 
be modified to correspond to current law and practice. 
THANK YOU TO OUR SPONSORS 
Ontario Bar Association's Institute 2018 would not be possible without the generous 
financial support of our sponsors. 
Welcome Reception Sponsor 
Mercedes-Benz 
Platinum Sponsors 
) CBA LAWYERS stewart titI 
FINANCIAL Real pattnets. Real passJbllUes 
Be ready. 
LpracHce 3 llt1e 2>'PLui 
PRq TITLE INSURANCE 
THOMSON REUTERS 
Gold Sponsors Coffee Sponsor Venue Sponsor 
LexisNexis ACL TWENTY 
TORONTO STREET 
LAW TIMES  
CONFERENCES AND EVENTS 
Silver Sponsors 






DIVISION OF RCOH CaflAtrA INC.  
Korbitec
Please make time to visit the sponsor and exhibitor booths to see the latest legal products and services. 
HOW TO NAVIGATE HUMAN 
RIGHTS ISSUES RELEVANT IN TODAY'S 
WORKPLACE 
February 6, 2018 
PROGRAM CHAIRS 
Kiran Kang, Goldblatt Partners LIP 
Brooke Stewart, Davenport Law Group 
AGENDA 
9:00 am Welcome and Opening Remarks from the Co-Chairs 
9:05 am Exploring the Evolving Definition of Disability and the Evidence to Support It 
Faisal Bhabha, Osgoode Hall Law School 
Michelle Henry, Borden Ladner Gervais LLP 
Kerri Joffe, ARCH Disability Law Centre 
Moderator: Richa Sandill, MacDonald & Associates 
9:55 am What You Need to Know About Bill 148 
Adrian Ishak, Goodmans LLP 
Jodi Martin, Paliare Roland Rosenberg Rothstein LLP 
Bonny Mak Waterfall, Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP 
Moderator: Sharaf Sultan, Sultan Employment Law and Workplace Immigration 
10:45 am Networking Break 
11:00 am Key Developments, Trends and Opportunities in Remedies 
Michelle Flaherty, Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa 
Daniel Pugen, Torkin Manes LLP 
Bay Ryley, Ryley Law 
Moderator: Fiona Campbell, Goldblatt Partners LLP 
11:50 am Questions and Closing Remarks 
12:00 pm Program Concludes 
ceredlted (\ Sponsored by: 
CPD 
The OBA has been approved as an Accredited Provider of 
Professionalism Content by The Law Society of Ontario. 
This program contains oh is Professionalism Hour 
This program is eligible for up to 2h 45m 
HOW TO NAVIGATE HUMAN 
RIGHTS ISSUES RELEVANT IN TODAY'S 
WORKPLACE 
February 6, 2018 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TAB 1 The Case of the Cocaine-Using Coal Miner 
Faisal Bhabha, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University 
Definition of Disability in Human Rights Law: Select Annotated Cases 
Michelle Henry, Borden Ladner Gervais LLP 
Kerri Joffe, ARCH Disability Law Centre 
TAB 2 Topics in Labour Law and Bill 148 (Management and Union Perspectives) 
Jodi Martin, Paliare Roland Rosenberg Rothstein LLP 
Bonny Mak Waterfall, Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP 
TAB 3 Trends in Human Rights Damages: Courts, Statutory Tribunals and 
Labour Arbitration 
Michelle Flaherty, University of Ottawa 
Navigating Human Rights Issues: Public Interest Remedies 
Bay Ryley, Ryley Law 
Stewart v. Elk Valley: 
The Case of the Cocaine-Using Coal Miner 
Faisal Bhabha, Associate Professor 
Osgoode Hall Law School, York University 
Prepared for: 
OBA Institute 2018 
Exploring the Evolving Definition of Disability 
and Evidence to Support It 
January 19, 2018 
It has for some time been settled under section 15 of the Charter and within anti-
discrimination code definitions that "disability" includes "addictions". Labour boards 
and human rights tribunals have long accepted that "alcohol and drug addiction are 
illnesses and are physical and mental disabilities for the purposes of the Human Rights 
Code. There are no reasons to consider them any less an illness or disability than any 
other serious affliction."' The shift in expert consensus led to notable changes to the key 
American diagnostic instrument, the DSM 5, adopted in 2013 with a completely revised 
approach to addictions. What is significant for the purposes of disability law is that 
addiction, including both substance and behavioural addictions (e.g. gambling), is now 
broadly accepted as a mental illness. 
The definition of disability, roughly similar in domestic human rights codes and the 
international Disability Convention, includes: any condition, dysfunction, disorder or 
impairment, regardless the cause, and whether physical or mental.2 This last distinction 
has been effectively erased with a legal principle rejecting any hierarchy as between 
physical and mental disabilities.3 No matter the disability, all are worthy of inclusion. 
Disability human rights mean little if it does nothing to protect those with disabilities 
most despised or feared by the majority. If addictions are a indeed a mental disability, 
then a person with an addiction should be treated as just as "deserving" of legal 
protection as any other person with any other kind of physical or mental disability. 
In Tranchemontagne, Ontario's Court of Appeal outlined an analysis that applied this 
analysis in a manner that required recognizing that two alcoholic claimants who were 
explicitly excluded from a statutory benefit on account of their condition were "persons 
with disabilities".4 The statutory exclusion was discriminatory and the claimants were 
1 Mainland Sawmills v. Industrial Wood and Allied Workers of Canada, Local 2171 (Kandola 
Grievance), [2002] B.C.C.A.A.A. No. 69 at para. 69 
2 Under the Human Rights Code, RSO 1990, c H.19 [Code], s. 10(1) "disability" is defined as any degree of 
physical disability, infirmity, malformation or disfigurement; a condition of mental impairment; a learning 
disability; a mental disorder; or a workplace injury within the meaning of workers' compensation 
legislation 
3 Battlefords and District Co-operative Ltd. v. Gibbs, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 566. 
Ontario (Disability Support Program) v. Tranchemontagne, 2010 ONCA 593 
Page 2 of 22 
entitled to the income support benefit. According to the Court, the exclusion of 
substance dependence from the statutory definition of "disability" resulted in an 
unjustifiable denial of a benefit that offended the guarantee of equal treatment with 
respect to services within the meaning of Ontario's Human Rights Code. The exclusion 
explicitly disqualified a person with a particular type of illness. The facts in 
Tranchemontagne were simple and straightforward, and the Court had little difficulty 
treating serious alcohol addiction as a disability. 
However, commentators have noted that although the case was relatively 
straightforward, the courts required such a voluminous record of evidence that it 
presented a "risk going forward... that the Court's decision will be interpreted to require 
proof of the very amorphous aspects of discrimination that have proven so difficult to 
demonstrate and to make proceedings more complex instead of more accessible."5  
There may be legitimate concern that this particular expansion of disability human 
rights is too contingent on relying on medical experts and "expertise". Critical disability 
scholars and activists have challenged the dominant medical discourse that grounds 
disability in the language of illness and impairment, rather than focusing on difference 
and disadvantage. Yet, for the purpose of defining what is a disability who qualifies, 
there is no question that medical expertise offers unmatched empirical rigour. This is 
especially valuable when dealing with hinterland disabilities - those which are only 
emerging or are so socially sensitive as to be forced to the margins. Social stigma, moral 
judgment and shame can distort the way the public, and in turn, public policy, treats 
such disabilities. The purpose of the law is to ensure that there is no creating uneven 
playing fields. 
The strength of a human rights law approach to disability rights enforcement has been 
compelling boards, tribunals and courts to apply purposive discrimination analysis to 
factual situations where there is medical evidence to support claims related to a variety 
Lesli Bisgould, "Human Rights Code v. Charter: Implications of Tranchemontagne Twists and Turns and 
Seventeen Volumes of Evidence, or How Procedural Developments Might Have Influenced Substantive 
Human Rights Law", (2012) 9 JL & Equality at 33 
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of substance and behavioural addictions including alcohol, drugs, gambling, sex, internet 
gaming, and food, among others. Perhaps for that reason, Bisgould reads between the 
lines of Tranchemontagne, and argues that the case transcended its own facts and 
"became much more about the test for discrimination and the evidence tendered in an 
effort to 'justify' it". One might be more specific and say that it was about applying the 
test for discrimination when dealing with the case of a difficult disability that is 
associated with people and behaviours that are generally despised and viewed as 
personal moral failure. In Tranchemontagne, this issue never made it to the Supreme 
Court of Canada. The missed opportunity might be one of a variety of reasons the Court 
decided to grant leave to hear Elk Valley.6 In any event, the Court's judgment in Elk 
Valley can only be viewed as the next, important chapter in the emergent story of 
addictions disability law. A close read of the three distinct judgments reveals how deep 
differences of opinion can run when it comes to identifying and justifying 
discrimination. 
Elk Valley Facts—Cocaine in the Coal Mine 
Stewart worked in a coal mine driving a loader. He had been with the company for more 
than a decade in a job that there was little controversy was safety-sensitive. Mining 
operations are known to be among the most precarious workplaces of all, with 
comparatively higher risk of injury or death than most other workplaces. 
The mine operators who employed Stewart had an "Alcohol, Illegal Drugs and 
Medication Policy" (the 'Policy'). The Policy created a zero tolerance rule for "illegal 
drugs", meaning any employee could be terminated for any drug use. The Policy created 
an exception whereby an employee could offer prior disclosure of any dependence or 
addiction issues and benefit from opportunities for rehabilitation in the event of 
substance-related conduct. Instead of dismissal, an employee could go into treatment 
6 Stewart v. Elk Valley Coal Corp., 2017 SCC 30 ("Elk Valley"). 
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and come back to a job. This would only be available to someone who had self-identified 
as an addict prior to the incident. 
Stewart was aware of this policy, which was adopted five months before the incident. He 
did not disclose to his employer that he was addicted to cocaine, despite the fact that he 
used cocaine regularly on his days off. The Tribunal accepted that he was not, at that 
time, aware of his addiction. One day, near the end of a long shift, Stewart was involved 
in an accident while operating the vehicle. No one was injured and there was minimal 
damage, but the employer required him to undergo a drug test. Stewart tested positive 
for cocaine. He was in breach of the Policy. 
Stewart immediately told his employer that he believed he may be addicted to cocaine. 
However, because he had not disclosed this prior to the incident, the employer did not 
consider his possible addiction or accommodate him with respect to the workplace 
Policy. The employer essentially refused to consider his addiction as a factor in its 
employer obligations to him. Because he had failed to comply with the disclosure 
requirement in the Policy, Stewart was not eligible for any disability accommodation 
under the Policy. His disability was treated as irrelevant, a non-fact, because it was not 
disclosed prior to the incident. Because his addiction was a non-fact, there was no 
justification for Stewart's drug use and he was thus terminated from his employment—
not because of his drug addiction, but because of his drug use. 
The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada ultimately agreed that the employer was 
entitled to terminate Stewart. For six justices, there was no need to consider the duty to 
accommodate because there was no prima fade discrimination (i.e. there was no 
connection between Stewart's drug addiction and the termination of his employment); 
while for two concurring justices, there was discrimination but it was accommodated to 
the point of undue hardship. 
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In a sole dissent, Gascon J. gave weight to four additional facts that he deemed relevant 
to the analysis in the case, and on which he concluded the termination was both 
discriminatory and without justification: 
o Firstly, Stewart was a longstanding employee with Elk Valley and had a clean 
disciplinary record for the last nine years, and had gained seniority and 
benefits as a result7  
o Secondly, the Policy which the employer relied on was unilaterally imposed 
on the employees well into Stewart's employment.8  
o Third, the drug test that Stewart underwent did not conclude that he was 
under the influence during the accident, only that he had used cocaine in the 
past 21 hours.9 
o Lastly, the Policy states that disciplinary action against an employee who tests 
positive for drugs "will be based on all relevant circumstances", including 
deterrence of such behaviour but also the employee's employment record, the 
circumstances surrounding the positive drug test and the pattern of usage.10 
History of the Case 
The case originated in 2012 in the Alberta Human Rights Tribunal (AHRT). The Tribunal 
decision, authored by Mr. Justice Paul Chrumka of the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench, 
accepted with no difficulty, that Stewart had a disability protected by human rights 
legislation. Applying the two-part test for discrimination in the workplace, the Tribunal 
found that prima fade discrimination was not established because Stewart was 
terminated for failing to comply with the workplace Policy, not because of his cocaine 
addiction.11 Even if prima facie discrimination was established, the Tribunal stated 
alternatively that the employer could not have accommodated Stewart because 
Ibid. at para 64. 
8 Ibid. at para. 65. 
Ibid. at para. 66. 
10 Ibid. at para. 67. 
11 Bish [o.b.o. Stewart] v. Elk Valley Coal Corporation, 2012 AHRC 7 (CanLII)\ 
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accommodating his addiction would have so diluted the deterrence capacity of the 
Policy that it would be rendered ineffective.12 It would be unduly hard. 
Yet, the principal finding that there was insufficient connection between the addiction 
and the termination hinged on the weight the Tribunal put on its factual finding that 
Stewart was not rendered incapable of making behavioural choices by virtue of his drug 
dependence. The Tribunal cited affirmatively the British Columbia Court of Appeal in a 
case where an alcoholic employee was dismissed for theft from the liquor store in which 
he worked: "The fact that alcohol dependent persons may demonstrate 'deterioration in 
ethical or moral behaviour' and may have a greater temptation to steal alcohol from 
their workplace if exposed to it, does not permit an inference that the employer's 
conduct in terminating the employee was based on or influenced by alcohol 
dependency."13 
The BC Court of Appeal also found in that case that it is not discriminatory for an 
employer to consider irrelevant the fact that it operates a workplace that presents 
increased temptation to steal (for an addict). Similarly, the Alberta Human Rights 
Tribunal found that Stewart is not subjected to a unique burden when a workplace rule 
subjects only persons with his type of disability to a unique set of conditions and 
burdens in order to be entitled to accommodation. The logic is not self-evident. If the 
Policy is the only thing obstructing the drug-dependent worker from accessing 
accommodation, then how can the Policy legitimately serve as the sole basis for 
termination of employment? The Tribunal also failed to note a salient factor 
distinguishing Stewart's case from the BC case: namely, that only one involves culpable 
conduct - stealing. In the case of Stewart, there was no culpable conduct other than 
breaching the no drugs policy. His termination "was due to the failure of Mr. Stewart to 
stop using drugs and failing to disclose his use prior to the accident".14 The fact the 
Tribunal viewed Stewart's case as analytically analogous to the case of a worker who 
12 Ibid. at paras. 149-152. 
13 British Columbia (Public Service Agency) v. British Columbia Government and Service Employees' 
Union [2008] B.C.J. No. 1760 (Gooding) (BCCA). 
14 Bish, supra, at para. 20. 
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steals to support an addiction suggests a significant shortcoming in the contextual 
understanding of the facts. However, it also appears to have set the tone for the 
reviewing courts' consideration of the facts as found by the Tribunal. 
In a 2013 appeal to the Alberta Queen's Bench, the case was dismissed on the basis that 
the Tribunal had correctly concluded that the reason for termination was the breach of 
the Policy, not the addiction.15 The court observed, incidentally, that if a case of prima 
fade discrimination was in fact made out, then the Tribunal was unreasonable in 
concluding that Stewart was accommodated since he was unaware of his addiction and 
therefore could not be fairly expected to self-report as required. However, the court 
found that the mere existence of a nexus between the addiction and the Policy was not 
sufficient to discharge Stewart's preliminary onus of establishing a prima fade case of 
discrimination. He had to also show additionally that the adverse treatment was based 
on "stereotypical or arbitrary assumptions", which he had not done.16 
This reasoning echoed what the 2010 Ontario Court of Appeal judgment did in 
Tranchemontagne, including as a condition of establishing a prima facie case of 
discrimination "demonstrating a distinction that creates a disadvantage by perpetuating 
prejudice or stereotyping".17 The question of whether perpetuation of prejudice or 
stereotyping is properly considered a condition rather than an indication of 
discrimination remained contested until the Supreme Court addressed it in the final 
judgment in the present case. The majority left no question: "The existence of 
arbitrariness or stereotyping is not a stand-alone requirement for proving prima 
fade discrimination. Requiring otherwise would improperly focus on 'whether a 
discriminatory attitude exists, not a discriminatory impact', the focus of the 
discrimination inquiry" [emphasis in original].18 
iS Bish v. Elk Valley Coal Corporation, 2013 ABQB 756 
16 Ibid. at para. 38. 
17 Tranchemontagne, supra. 
18 Elk Valley, SCC at para. 45. 
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In 2015, a majority of the Alberta Court of Appeal dismissed Stewart's appeal and found 
that no prima fade discrimination could be found in the case because the addiction was 
not a 'real' factor in the adverse impact of the termination. The Tribunal had stated that 
"the adverse effect must be causally linked, in some fashion, to the disability."19 Because 
it found no causal link between Stewart's cocaine addiction and his termination, the 
decision to terminate could not have been discriminatory on the basis of disability and 
there was no duty to accommodate Stewart's drug use. One dissenting judge, O'Ferrall J., 
concluded that the addiction was clearly a factor in Stewart's termination and was thus 
discriminatory, and that he was not accommodated to the point of undue hardship. 
With multiple judgments, a variety of analytical approaches, and a strong dissenting 
view on appeal, the case was ripe for further appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. 
Majority Judgment at the SCC 
What made the case unique and valid for appeal were questions of national importance 
related to discrimination law and the administrative review of human rights tribunal 
decisions. Yet, the majority of the Court, led by then-Chief Justice, Mcbachlin, resolved 
early in the judgment to limit its scope to a reaffirmation of the application of "settled 
principles on workplace disability discrimination" whereby the findings of first-instance 
fact-finders are shown high deference. The standard of review was reasonableness, not 
correctness, as Stewart had argued. 
Six of nine justices found the Tribunal's decision to be reasonable, meaning that it fell 
within a range of reasonable conclusions to reach on the basis of the facts found. Three 
judges agreed with Stewart that his termination was prima facie discriminatory, but two 
went on to justify the discrimination on the basis of workplace safety and the need to 
deter dangerous practices in safety-sensitive workplaces. Only one justice found the 
Tribunal's conclusion unreasonable and the discrimination unjustifiable because it 
19 Ibid. 
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rewarded the employer for having no discriminatory intent despite the fact that its 
workplace policy directly caused Stewart, an addict, to be dismissed for drug use. The 
dissent highlighted the disregard for obvious adverse effects caused by a zero-tolerance 
drug policy on an individual who, as a drug addict, fits squarely within the protected 
category of disability. 
The central question of the appeal concerned the third step of the test for prima facie 
discrimination. Adopting the language of the Court in Moore , the question in this case 
was whether Stewart's disability was "a factor" in the termination of his employment. 
The Tribunal had found that Stewart's addiction was not a factor in the termination. It 
concluded that he was dismissed because he failed to comply with the Policy by using 
drugs and failing to disclose his addiction. Pointing to the termination letter, which 
emphasized how Stewart's actions were contrary to the Policy, the majority accepted 
that the employer was concerned with enforcing workplace policies, not with unfairly 
targeting addicts.20 The majority accepted the Tribunal's finding that "Stewart had the 
capacity to comply with the terms of the Policy" and concluded that it "was therefore not 
unreasonable for the Tribunal to conclude that there was no prima fade discrimination 
in this case."21  
The Court noted that the Tribunal had acknowledged "that people with addictions may 
experience denial and that the distinction between termination due to disability and 
termination due to the failure to follow a policy may appear 'superficial' given that the 
failure to follow a policy may be a symptom of an addiction or disability", but the fact 
that Stewart still maintained some capacity to control his addiction and knew he should 
not be taking drugs meant that he could be terminated for his failure to comply with the 
Policy.22 
20 Elk Valley, SCC atparas. 28-31. 
21 Ibid. atpara. 35. 
22 Ibid. at paras. 32, 38. 
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The second reason the Tribunal gave for upholding the termination was that even if the 
Policy discriminated again Stewart, it accommodated him up to the point of undue 
hardship. Where personal control was not completely lost, it was not unreasonable to 
require prior disclosure. The majority emphasized that addiction impacts people in 
different ways and, thus, a case by case analysis would be required to assess the degree 
of control any given addict may have: 
In some cases, a person with an addiction may be fully capable of 
complying with workplace rules. In others, the addiction may 
effectively deprive a person of the capacity to comply, and the breach of 
the rule will be inextricably connected with the addiction. Many cases 
may exist somewhere between these two extremes.23  
While Stewart was found to have been able to comply with the Policy, the majority's 
reasoning gives little indication as to the future application of the judgment. It may be 
that most addicts will be presumed to exercise sufficient choice with respect to their 
behaviour, which could make human rights protections essentially unavailable. If many 
of the cases exist between clear extremes of choice and no choice, it is impossible to 
predict how justified other employers will be in terminating addicts' employment for 
non-culpable policy breaches, let alone for culpable conduct. 
It is also not clear what evidence will suffice to demonstrate loss of control, which is a 
common symptom of addiction. What is clear from the majority's reasoning is that the 
mere existence of an addiction does not by itself establish prima fade discrimination on 
the ground of disability. If that were the case, the court worried it could stand to reason 
that workplaces may never limit any form of addictive behaviour. What would become 
of no-smoking policies that impede the needs of nicotine addicted employees?24 Because 
the Tribunal found as fact that Stewart had a degree of control over his use of drugs that 
23 Ibid. at para. 39 
24 Ibid. at para. 42. 
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would have enabled him to follow the Policy, his disability could not be considered a 
factor in the adverse impact that he suffered.25  
The majority further noted that the Tribunal had considered whether the Policy itself 
adversely impacted Stewart. Because the Policy affected both recreational drug users 
and drug addicts in the same way, it could not be said to be targeting Stewart on account 
of his disability.26 The majority did acknowledge that the opposite conclusion, namely 
that Stewart's disability was a factor in his termination, could also be reasonably drawn 
from the facts. The role of appellate courts, according to the Chief Justice, was not to 
reassess evidence, but instead to review whether the conclusion of Tribunal fell within a 
reasonable range.27 On that measure, six judges agreed the decision was reasonable. 
The majority judgment also addressed two points which it identified as obiter, but which 
necessitated some comment. First, the Court was clear in dispelling once and for all the 
notion that there is a condition or requirement to show stereotypical or arbitrary 
decision making in order to prove a prima fade case of discrimination. It offered a 
restatement of the existing test.28 Secondly, the majority emphasized that the third part 
of the test requires only that disability be afactor in the adverse impact. No qualifiers 
such as "significant", "causal" or "material" should be added to this part of the test.29 
Minority Judgment, Concurring Result 
For the minority justices, Moldaver and Wagner JJ., the reasoning of the majority was too 
implausible to adopt, though the pair agreed with the majority's result. For the minority, 
both the Tribunal and the majority put far too much weight on assumed facts about 
Stewart's capacity to "choose" his behaviour. The problem for them was the assumption 
"that because Mr. Stewart had a limited ability to make choices about his drug use, there 
25 Ibid 
26 Ibid. at para. 34. 
27 Ibid. at para. 41. 
28 Ibid. at para. 45. 
29 Ibid. at para. 46. 
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was no connection between his dependency on cocaine and his termination on the basis 
of testing positive for cocaine".30 The minority could not accept the majority's reasoning 
on this point. 
Just as there is a spectrum of "ability" with respect to Stewart's agency and choice, there 
may also have been a spectrum of degrees of "connection" between his cocaine habit and 
the termination of his employment. It need not be an all-or-nothing analysis. Yet, it 
appears that the fact that there was not a significant connection or a direct causal 
connection, the majority were content to dismiss the existence of Stewart's right. It is 
difficult to explain or justify this analysis given the current state of the law on this 
subject and the explicit statements in the majority judgment with respect to the "factor" 
test. 
On this point, the minority pair agreed with the dissenter and found that even if the 
Tribunal concluded that Stewart had some control over his use of drugs, this "merely 
reduced the extent to which his dependency contributed to his termination - it did not 
eliminate it as a 'factor' in his termination".31 Even with diminished choice control, 
Stewart was still a person experiencing the disabling effects of his condition in a way 
which both made him vulnerable by virtue of stigma, and which caused him direct harm 
and disadvantage by operation of the workplace Policy. The minority found that the 
Tribunal failed to acknowledge the obvious fact that Stewart's disability was, at 
minimum, one factor among others in his termination.32 
A Deep Dissent 
The dissenting reasons of Gascon J. adopted a very different tone and context for 
considering the relevant legal issue. The judgment begins with a discussion of the 
stigmatization of people with drug dependencies. Common stereotypes include the view 
30 Ibid. at para. 49. 
31 Ibid. at para. 50 (referencing para. 120, dissenting reasons) 
32 Ibid. 
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that they are "the authors of their own misfortune.1133 As a result of stigma, such 
individuals can be "caught in a majoritarian blind spot in the discrimination discourse", 
meaning they fail to be included within "the scope of human rights protections11.34 
Without saying it directly, Gascon makes a damning accusation against his colleagues on 
the bench. 
In evaluating the Tribunal's decision on the issue of whether prima fade discrimination 
was established, Gascon J. found that the conclusion reached by the Tribunal was 
unreasonable because even though the Tribunal applied the correct test, it 
misunderstood a key discrimination law principle: namely the distinction between 
direct and indirect discrimination. 
The Tribunal's analysis emphasized Stewart's choice to take drugs and examined 
whether he exercised control over his actions. In so focusing, the Tribunal only 
considered one form of discrimination, namely "direct" discrimination. The Policy, 
which seeks to regulate the act of taking drugs, ignored the motivation for taking drugs - 
the addiction. In failing to consider the motivation to take drugs, the Policy makes drug 
addiction an indirect cause of termination. In other words, the neutral rule against 
taking drugs has an adverse effect on people who take drugs because of a dependency. It 
imposes a burden that is not imposed on others who do not share their dependency. 
On the issue of the majority's focus on the degrees of impairments and the aspect of 
control, he wrote that every addict except those who have not been impacted at all by 
their drug addiction, should benefit from the scope of what constitutes a 'factor' in terms 
of the test for prima fade discrimination.35 He built on the point made by the majority 
that the protected ground need only be one factor, with no qualifying language to be 
read into that test. For Gascon J., demands for more onerous burdens were to be faulted 
33 Ibid. at para. 58. 
" Ibid. at para. 59. 
Ibid. at para. 89. 
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for creating a "choice threshold", which shifts the "burden on complainants to avoid 
discrimination, rather than on employers not to discriminate".36 
He criticized the majority's approach for attributing choices that are significant to one's 
identity, effectively removing rights holders from protected grounds, with no 
justification. He highlighted the hypocrisy in the majority's judgment in light of the fact 
that the Court has always refused to draw distinctions between protected grounds and 
conduct inextricably linked to those grounds.37 Similar analyses distinguishing between 
same-sex action and same-sex people, between being a woman and getting pregnant,38  
and between holding and manifesting religious beliefs,39 have been roundly rejected by 
the Court. Yet, the majority's judgment in this case hinged on upholding a clear and 
illogical distinction between being an addict and taking drugs. Finally, Gascon J. noted 
that choice thresholds tend to result in blaming members of marginalized groups for 
their choices, which reinforces the stigma they already experience in society.40 
Gascon J. found that the "factor" test was misapplied by both the Tribunal and the 
majority to the extent that it considered only whether Stewart's addiction was "not a 
factor" in the employer's intention to fire him, rather than the proper question of 
whether his addiction was a factor in the termination of his employment. The distinction 
is an important one: 
If discriminatory intent were dispositive of contribution, the relevant 
relationship would be that between an employee's protected ground 
and the corporation's intent to harm that employee. But contribution 
emphasizes discriminatory effect. Indeed, for human rights legislation 
36 Ibid. at para. 99. 
37 Ibid. at paras. 99-100. 
38 See Brooks v. Canada Safeway Ltd., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1219 ("Discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is a 
form of sex discrimination because of the basic biological fact that only women have the capacity to become 
pregnant.") 
39 See Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698 at para. 57 ("The right to freedom of religion 
enshrined in s. 2(a) of the Charter encompasses the right to believe and entertain the religious beliefs of 
one's choice, the right to declare one's religious beliefs openly and the right to manifest religious belief." 
40 Elk Valley SCC at para. 101. 
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to protect against "indirect discrimination" - i.e. neutral rules with 
adverse consequences for certain groups - intent cannot be a 
requirement for prima facie discrimination.41  
Gascon J. concluded that the Tribunal constructed "a false dichotomy", i.e. Stewart must 
have been "terminated because of either his addiction or the Policy". This, despite the 
fact that all of the evidence supported the conclusion that Stewart's termination was 
related to both the Policy and his addiction.42 While the Tribunal repeated that Stewart's 
addiction was "not a factor" in his termination, its reasoning could only support the 
more narrow conclusion that his addiction was not a factor in his employer's intention to 
dismiss him.43 The proper question to ask, however, was whether the addiction was a 
factor in the termination of employment broadly understood. 
Citing the Court's definitive judgments on the subject, Gascon J. noted that Meiorin 
(1999) Moore (2012) and Bombardier (20 15) all support the basic assertion that intent 
is irrelevant to the question of whether discriminatory considerations were likely a 
factor at play in the termination of employment.44 For Gascon J., the Tribunal's 
interpretation of what constitutes a "factor" was flawed because it failed to look at 
adverse effects. 45 The Tribunal made several key findings to support a claim of adverse 
effects discrimination: Stewart was dependent on cocaine; he was unaware of his 
dependence; and addiction necessarily means impaired control over drug use. 
Thus, while the Policy may have applied to all workers equally, Stewart clearly had an 
impaired ability to comply with its zero tolerance of illegal drugs due to his cocaine 
dependence. Furthermore, Gascon J. noted the employer was not unaware or 
unconscious of Stewart's addiction, and therefore could not claim to have given no 
consideration whatsoever to Stewart's disability in the course of dismissing him. On the 
41 Ibid. at para. 80. 
42 Ibid. atpara. 111. 
43 Ibid. at paras. 71, 112. 
" Ibid. at paras. 82-84. 
45 Ibid. atpara. 118. 
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contrary, in the termination letter itself, the employer stated, "we are hopeful you will 
find the personal resolve that is necessary to overcome an addiction". With this back-
hand slap, the employer at once terminated a vulnerable, loyal employee, while at the 
same time insulting him for being disabled. It is bewildering that eight justices of the 
Supreme Court were content to uphold a decision as reasonable that was so clearly laced 
with prejudice and contempt for the afflicted worker. It is worth recalling that Stewart 
had not done anything wrong except for taking drugs in contravention of the Policy. 
There was no independent culpable action. 
Gascon J. examined the evidentiary record relied upon by the Tribunal and focused on 
the post-incident interview transcript between the employer and Stewart. This is the 
record of the interview completed as part of the employer's investigation into the 
workplace accident. It showed that the employer was clearly interested in Stewart's 
drug use/dependence. Numerous questions focused on his patterns of use, his subjective 
perception of whether he is an addict, and what his intentions are with respect to 
treatment.46 Gascon J. found that it was unreasonable, on this evidence, to conclude that 
the employer was not "at least interested in whether Mr. Stewart was drug-dependent, if 
not primarily motivated by that concern. This was not a mere fact in the background.1147 
The only reasonable conclusion on the evidence was that Stewart had an impaired 
ability to comply with the terms of the workplace Policy because he was an addict.48  
Everybody, including the employer, were aware that there was a connection between 
Stewart's drug dependence and his likelihood and ability to comply with the Policy. 
Merely establishing this connection should have been sufficient to satisfy the prima facie 
case. Since the Tribunal wrongly applied legal principles and legal tests, and the record 
established that Stewart's addiction was a factor in his termination, Gascon J. found the 
Tribunal's decision to be unreasonable. 
46 Ibid. at para. 121 
47 Ibid. at para. 122. 
48 Ibid. at paras. 117-118. 
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Duty to Accommodate - When and How (Much)? 
The majority judgment, finding no prima fade discrimination, sidestepped the issue of 
accommodation.49 The duty to accommodate is not a freestanding, positive right. Rather, 
it is triggered as a function of the right to be free from discrimination. Only when a 
claimant can establish a prima fade infringement of the freedom to be free from 
discrimination does the question of accommodation arise. Cases mostly concern neutral 
workplace rules that have a disparate impact on members of certain groups protected 
by anti-discrimination law; or, in some cases, directly discriminatory rules that 
expressly include or exclude members of protected groups. When triggered, 
accommodation is a mandatory reconciliation exercise designed to test the possibility 
for compromise, failing which, to establish reasonable justification for permitting 
discrimination. 
For the two minority justices, it was not difficult to see that discrimination occurred, but 
that nothing more could be done to protect Stewart from the consequences of his 
disability. They agreed that the employer could not have accommodated Stewart in any 
better or different fashion without encountering undue hardship. The basis for this 
conclusion was, first, safety, which is a relevant consideration when assessing undue 
hardship in the context of safety-sensitive workplaces. Moldaver and Wagner JJ. gave 
considerable weight to the fact that mining operations are notoriously dangerous.50 
While disciplinary measures short of termination were available to the employer, in 
these conditions, the minority were not convinced that anything short of immediate 
termination would not "undermine the Policy's deterrent effect" and therefore 
constitute undue hardship.51  
Invoking an old rule taken completely out of context, the minority pointed out that an 
"employee is not entitled to perfect accommodation, but rather to accommodation that 
49 Ibid. at para. 47. 
° Ibid. at para 55 [relying on CentralAlberta Dairy Pool vAlberta (HRC)] 
51 Ibid. at para. 55. 
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is reasonable in the circumstances".52 They pointed to the employer's offer for Stewart to 
reapply for employment after six months provided he enter rehabilitation, and the 
employer's commitment to reimburse him 50% of the cost of rehabilitation (under some 
conditions) should he be re-hired.53 Given these measures, Moldaver and Wagner JJ. 
were persuaded that immediate termination was not an unduly harsh way to treat a 
disabled employee and was therefore reasonable in circumstances. 
In dissent, Gascon J. applied a different analysis and reached a different conclusion on 
the question of accommodation. Applying the three-part justificatory test from Meiorin, 
he agreed that the only part of the test that was in dispute was the third part - what 
constitutes "undue hardship"? Disagreeing with the minority, however, Gascon J. stated 
that the only way to "reasonably accommodate" an employee is to examine that person 
as an individual, citing both Meiorin and Martin (SCC 2003) in support of this doctrine.54 
By not undertaking an individualized assessment, the employer "made no effort to 
specifically accommodate Mr. Stewart as an individual, contrary to the guidance of this 
Court", according to Gascon J.55  He found the alternative conclusion reached by the 
Tribunal—that because Stewart did not fulfil his own duty to request accommodation, 
his employer did not have any duty to accommodate him—to be unreasonable and 
"indefensible" in light of the fact that the Tribunal acknowledged Stewart was unaware 
of his addiction prior to the incident. 
Gascon J. points out that his colleagues have found the employer did enough to 
accommodate Stewart when, in fact, the evidence showed the employer did absolutely 
nothing to accommodate Stewart. The only "accommodation" the employer could be 
said to have offered is the permission to employees to disclose their addictions without 
penalty as long as it is prior to any incident. This "pre-incident accommodation" was not 
available to Stewart given his inability to come to terms with his own disability 
according to the employer's schedule. Because denial is itself a symptom of the disability 
52 See Central Okanagan School District No. 23 v. Renaud 
53 Ibid. at para. 56. 
' Ibid. at paras. 126, 129. 
55 Ibid. atpara. 130. 
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of substance dependency, the rigid schedule imposed by the Policy required flexibility in 
order to include accommodation options for Stewart. The employer's approach to 
accommodation meant that Stewart was completely excluded from its reach. On the 
issue of deterrence, Gascon J. was not convinced by the minority's acceptance that 
termination of employment is the only result that can achieve the deterrent goal. He 
opined that deterrence could still be accomplished through suspension-without-pay.56 
Gascon thus found the Tribunal decision on these points to be unreasonable. 
Conclusion 
It is difficult to square the majority judgment in Elk Valley with the Court's long standing 
disability equality and workplace anti-discrimination jurisprudence. While couched in 
the deferential language of reasonableness administrative review, the majority were 
content to endorse what is at its core a formal equality frame and an underlying decision 
that in many ways mischaracterizes addictions disability. One must consider the 
inescapable fact that addictions remain a highly stigmatized behaviour and this may 
account for jurisprudential distortions and inconsistencies. Addicts receive little of the 
sympathy and compassion society reserves for other socially vulnerable groups who are 
systemically excluded from opportunities. Consider a similar case decided nearly two 
decades earlier dealing with the status of women in the workplace. In Meiorin,57 
McLachlin J. (as she then was) wrote for a unanimous Court holding that even if a 
workplace policy is neutral in language, if it disproportionally affects members of one 
protected group over others, it is producing an indirect form of discrimination which 
must be addressed by human rights laws.58  
In Elk Valley, McLachlin CJ made passing reference to Meiorin but failed to adequately 
respond to the inescapable vulnerability in the majority judgment: How does the 
Policy's ban on drug use and requirement of prior disclosure of an addiction not 
56 Ibid. at para. 144. 
57 British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. BCGSEU, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 
3 ("Meiorin") 
58 Stewart, SCC at paras. 104-105. 
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constitute an unequal burden on individuals who are drug dependent? Just as strenuous 
physical testing did not directly target female firefighters, a strict drug policy need not 
directly target drug addicts. It only needs to have an acute, indirect impact on members 
of the protected group to be considered discriminatory. Because women are less likely 
to meet the strenuous physical standard, the firefighting standard was prima facie 
discriminatory. It requires no logical leap to similarly consider that because a drug 
addict is less likely to meet the zero-tolerance drug policy, the policy is prima facie 
discriminatory. There appears no explanation for the Court's departure from the 
established equality framework except that the majority simply chose not to view 
addicts in the same light as other equality seekers. 
Commentators have mostly noted the limited applicability of the Elk Valley judgment. 
The rules and reasoning are so unique to the safety-sensitive context, that it is unclear 
what guidance a wider spectrum of employers can take from the case. In the absence of 
mandatory drug testing, which most workplaces do not practice, it is difficult to see how 
an employee in Stewart's circumstances would otherwise come to the attention of 
employers. The question of whether employers can take from the judgment a general 
permission to require prior disclosure as a condition for disability accommodation in 
the case of drug (and other?) addicts is not clearly settled. The judgment best stands as a 
reaffirmation of foundational principles concerning the protection of addiction as a 
disability within the human rights framework and for the further clarification of the 
requirements of the prima facie test for discrimination. Given that only three justices 
addressed the question of undue hardship, it is not evident that the case offers as much 
as it might have by way of clarification of principles governing the undue hardship 
analysis. The only conclusion to draw is that undue hardship analysis involves difficult 
decision making and does not offer a predictable course to an acceptable result. 
Regarding the limits on preventative workplace drug testing, it is important to note that 
the Ontario Court of Appeal decision in Entrop59 has not been overruled by Elk Valley.60 
59 Entrop v Imperial Oil, (2000) 50 OR (3d) 18 (CA). 
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In Entrop, the Court determined that it was reasonable and bonafide for an employer to 
practice randomized drug tests only on employees in safety-sensitive jobs, and that 
automatic dismissal for a breach was inconsistent with the employer's duty to 
accommodate. Sanctions had to be tailored to the employee's particular circumstances. 
Similarly, Entrop's policy mandating disclosure of current or past substance use 
problems, and automatic reassignment to a non-safety sensitive position, was found to 
discriminate against recovering addicts, who would be unfairly disadvantaged by 
"prevention" regardless of any actual risk. As for addicts still using substances, 
disclosure under the policy would lead to a mandatory two years of rehabilitation 
followed by a five-year waiting period before they would be considered for 
reinstatement to a safety-sensitive position. The Court found this to be discriminatory 
because such conditions were not reasonably necessary to ensure that employees in 
safety-sensitive positions were not impaired on the job. 
Despite distinguishing facts and legal issues, it is nonetheless surprising that the Court 
in Elk Valley did not engage with any of the discrimination analysis in Entrop. It will 
remain to be seen how the growing body of binding and persuasive jurisprudence with 
respect to dealing with addictions disabilities in the workplace will shape future 
employment practices. No doubt, the landscape of this area is bound to continue to 
evolve as courts and tribunals grapple with rapidly changing social realities and 
emerging medical evidence. 
60 It is rather surprising that the Court in Elk Valley did not mention Entrop. 
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